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ABSTRACT
Cloud vendors are increasingly offering machine learning services
as part of their platform and services portfolios. These services en-
able the deployment of machine learning models on the cloud that
are offered on a pay-per-query basis to application developers and
end users. However recent work has shown that the hosted mod-
els are susceptible to extraction attacks. Adversaries may launch
queries to steal the model and compromise future query payments
or privacy of the training data. In this work, we present a cloud-
based extraction monitor that can quantify the extraction status of
models by observing the query and response streams of both indi-
vidual and colluding adversarial users. We present a novel tech-
nique that uses information gain to measure the model learning
rate by users with increasing number of queries. Additionally, we
present an alternate technique that maintains intelligent query sum-
maries to measure the learning rate relative to the coverage of the
input feature space in the presence of collusion. Both these ap-
proaches have low computational overhead and can easily be of-
fered as services to model owners to warn them of possible ex-
traction attacks from adversaries. We present performance results
for these approaches for decision tree models deployed on BigML
MLaaS platform, using open source datasets and different adver-
sarial attack strategies.
1. INTRODUCTION
Most cloud service providers (CSPs) now offer machine learning
services that enable developers to train and host machine learning
(ML) models on the cloud. Application developers or end users can
access these models via prediction APIs on a pay-per-query basis.
Recent work has showed that the hosted ML models are suscepti-
ble to model extraction attacks. Adversaries may abuse a model’s
query API and launch a series of intelligent queries spanning the
input space to steal or replicate the hosted model, thus avoiding fu-
ture query charges. Moreover, access to the model parameters can
leak sensitive private information about the training data and facil-
itate evasion attacks especially if the model is utilized in security
applications such as malware or spam classification [6, 3, 2].
Machine learning models generally encapsulate confidential in-
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Figure 1: System Architecture
formation related to the problem domain. Additionally, the training
data used to construct the model may be private and expensive to
obtain. For instance, the business logic of an insurance firm is en-
coded in the model that predicts which customers are eligible for
insurance. Similarly, a significant number of expensive clinical tri-
als and private health records may have been used to train a model
that detects health issues in a patient. Therefore techniques to detect
or prevent ongoing model extraction attacks are of significant im-
portance to model owners and cloud service providers. Moreover,
knowing the status of model extraction can help price queries as a
function of extraction status and aid in making decisions regarding
packaging models at an attractive price within a cloud subscription
service.
Prior work [6] on model extraction showed that interpretable ML
models such as linear and logistic regression can be replicated us-
ing a constant number of queries (of order of number of features) by
solving a system of linear equations. For the non-interpretable ma-
chine learning models such as decision trees and neural networks,
the number of queries needed to recover the model is variable and
efficient attack strategies may be designed to successively steal the
models over time. The focus of this work is to provide extraction
status warnings for such machine learning models. In particular we
focus on decision tree models used for classification although the
proposed techniques are more broadly applicable to other machine
learning models as well. We output warnings related to model ex-
traction status for both single and multiple user query streams. In
case of multiple users, our techniques can indicate the model ex-
traction status in the presence of colluding adversaries.
Figure 1 depicts the problem setting with different stakeholders.
Model owners deploy their models on the cloud, which are accessed
by end users via pay-per-query APIs. The CSP manages the query
and response streams from each user to the deployed ML models.
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In order to detect extraction attacks from adversaries, we design
a cloud-based extraction monitor that continually informs model
owners of the information recoverable by users based on the queries
responded thus far. The extraction monitor has at least a partial
visibility of the deployed model in order to provide such a status,
with estimation quality improving with better visibility. We propose
two different strategies that the monitor uses to infer the model
learning rate of users. In the first strategy, the monitor computes
the information gain of the users based on their queries received
thus far. In order to do this, it uses a validation set supplied by the
model owner that has a distribution similar to the training set. In
the second strategy, the monitor maintains compact summaries of
user queries and estimates their coverage of the input space relative
to the partition induced by the source model. Both approaches can
also provide joint extraction status corresponding to queries of user
groups to understand the coverage of queries from colluding users.
In particular the key contributions of this work are as follows:
• We define a new metric to measure the information learnt by
a decision tree with increasing amount of training data. The
metric is based on entropy and measures the learning rate
of an evolving decision tree with respect to a validation set
provided by the model owner. It may be used to measure the
information gained by adversaries with increasing number of
API queries. We present a fast greedy algorithm that identi-
fies the maximum information gained by any set of k users
among all users who have queried the model, which may be
utilized in the presence of colluding adversaries.
• We define an alternate metric that measures the information
learnt by querying users by computing the coverage of the
input space relative to the partitions induced by the source
model owned by the owner. This approach maintains effi-
cient summaries of user query streams and can identify the
minimum number of users that have maximum information
about the model in polynomial time.
• We present experimental evaluation results for both ap-
proaches using open source datasets and decision trees de-
ployed on BigML MLaaS platform. We present model ex-
traction results for two attack strategies based on random
queries and an intelligent path finding algorithm from prior
work.
Related Work.
Most of the existing work on model extraction focuses on differ-
ent types of extraction or inversion attacks that divulge model pa-
rameters or sensitive private information about the training data to
adversaries querying the model [3, 1, 6]. Also model extraction can
facilitate evasion in applications such as spam filtering and anomaly
or malware detection [4, 2]. Although work has been done to ana-
lyze adversarial frameworks, we know of no prior work that esti-
mates the extraction status of an adversary and provides warnings
to model owners, which is the focus of our work.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the problem framework and section 3 presents two dif-
ferent approaches to compute model extraction status for both in-
dividual and colluding users. The experimental results with open
source datasets are presented in section 4. Lastly, conclusions and
directions for future work are presented in section 5.
2. PROBLEM FRAMEWORK
The MLaaS paradigm allows ML developers to train a model
based on their data and deploy it on the cloud. The end users query
the model using its prediction APIs. We regard an ML model as a
function f : X → y that maps a d-dimensional input feature vector
xi ∈ X to a prediction yi ∈ y, which is a categorical variable.
Model Extration Attack. In the case of a model extraction attack,
an adversary abuses the prediction API of a model f and attempts
to learn a model fˆ that achieves similar performance as f .
Adversary Model. In our work, the adversary can be a single user
or a group of colluding users that have access to the ML model’s
prediction API. Furthermore adversaries may have knowledge of
the model type (e.g. Decision Tree or Logistic Regression), or the
kind of data it is trained upon with the objective of learning the ML
model’s parameters via a sequence of intelligent queries.
Performance Metrics. In order to compare the performance of a
model fˆ learnt by an adversary with respect to the deployed source
model f , we compute the following metrics [6]. Note that the mon-
itor does not have access to any models learnt by the adversaries,
but simply their queries.
1−Rtest :
While building the source model f , the model owner generally
splits the dataset into train and test sets. We use this test data set T
to compare the performance of the source and learnt models.
Rtest =
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
I(fˆ(x(t)) 6= f(x(t))) (1)
where I denotes the indicator function. Thus 1 − Rtest represents
the accuracy of an adversary’s model with respect to the deployed
model.
1−Runif :
In addition to testing the adversary’s model on the test data set
that follows a specific distribution, we also test the learnt model
against a data set U that is generated uniformly from the input fea-
ture space.
Runif =
1
|U |
∑
t∈U
I(fˆ(x(t)) 6= f(x(t))) (2)
Thus 1 − Runif represents another metric to evaluate the perfor-
mance an adversary’s model as compared to a deployed model.
3. MODEL EXTRACTIONWARNING
Our goal is to design a cloud based monitor capable of provid-
ing model extraction status and warnings. Each query to a deployed
ML model f along with its response leaks a certain amount of in-
formation about the decision boundaries of the model to the user.
After having made multiple queries, an adversarial user can train
his own ML model fˆ over the query-response set, which has a cer-
tain performance accuracy as compared to the source model f . Our
objective is to detect if any set of clients of size k ≥ 1 can jointly
reconstruct a model that yields an accuracy beyond a given thresh-
old. The model owner may run the detection at fixed time intervals
or after a certain number of queries have been answered by the de-
ployed model. In the subsequent sections, we focus on the decision
tree models for classification and propose two strategies to detect
model extraction by adversarial users.
Strategy 1: Model Extraction Warning using
Information Gain.
Initialization.
Figure 2: Accuracy vs Information Gain
In this strategy, we assume that the model owner has provided an
extraction threshold t and a validation set to the monitor. The mon-
itor observes the query response pairs of each user and incremently
learns a local decision tree based on these pairs. Let S denote the
validation set, with each element having an input x and an associ-
ated class label y ∈ [k]. Let pi denote the probability that a random
element chosen from S belongs to the class i. Then the entropy of
S is defined by:
Entropy(S) = −
k∑
i=1
pi log pi (3)
Information gain of a decision tree.
Recall that the information gain of an attribute is defined as the
reduction in entropy of a training set when we partition it based
on values that the attribute can take [5]. We generalize this concept
and define a metric called the information gain of a decision tree
T with respect to a given validation set S. This metric is essen-
tially computed by the monitor on its local decision tree to estimate
the information gained by users based on their queries thus far. By
evaluating S on T , let S be partitioned into disjoint subsets {Sl}
by the leaf nodes of T . The information gain of T is defined as the
reduction in entropy as follows:
IGtree(S, T ) = Entropy(S)−
∑
l∈leaf(T )
|Sl|
|S| Entropy(Sl) (4)
where the entropy of a leaf node l i.e. Entropy(Sl) is computed
using the original class labels of the validation elements. Similarly,
one can apply Eq. (4) to compute the information gain of the model
owners source decision tree TO as IGtree(S, TO).
Figure 2 plots the accuracy of a user’s decision a tree with respect
to its information gain with increasing amount of training data. We
observe that information gain accurately captures the learning rate
of the user’s model.
Model Extraction Status Per User.
To compute the model extraction status for each user, the monitor
trains a local decision tree Tu based on all query-response pairs
made by user u to the source decision tree TO . It uses the validation
set S to compute the information gain IGtree(S, Tu) using eq.(4)
and the extraction status as follows:
Extraction_Statusu =
IGtree(S, Tu)
IGtree(S, TO)
∗ 100 (5)
For all the users whose Extraction_Status is more than the
threshold t, a model extraction warning is generated and sent to the
relevant model owners.
Model Extraction Status with Collusion.
In a general setting, a model owner would like to know if any k of
the n users accessing the deployed model are colluding to extract it.
We extend our existing approach to compute the model extraction
warning in case of collusion as follows.
In a brute force approach, a monitor would need to compute
the extraction status for all
(
n
k
)
combinations of users. Algo-
rithm 1 shows how the monitor can recover a set of k users
that have maximum knowledge of the deployed model using
their combined query data. In this algorithm the function call
DecisionTree(query_points) returns a decision tree trained
over the provided query_points.
Algorithm 1 combUserSelection
Input: validation set S, query history Q, parameter k
Output: set of k users, their extraction status
source_gain = IGtree(S, TO)
pool = combinations(n, k)
for c ∈ pool do
query_points = {}
for user ∈ c do
query_points = {query_points ∪Q[user]}
end for
gain[c] = IGtree(S,DecisionTree(query_points))
end for
U = argmax(gain)
max_gain = max(gain)
return U, (max_gain/source_gain) ∗ 100
The complexity of this algorithm is exponential in n. To over-
come the issue of exponential running time, we propose a greedy
algorithm, where at each step the monitor selects that user whose
query set in combination with the queries of selected users yields
a decision tree that has the highest information gain. Algorithm 2
gives the pseudo-code for the greedy method. The algorithm needs
a parameter k and the query history of all n users as input and re-
turns a set of k users that have the highest information along with
their extraction status.
Quality of Model Extraction Warning.
We present experimental results of model extraction warnings
on real datasets in Section 4, which shed light on the accuracy of
the extraction status. One of the factors that affects the quality of
warning is the classification accuracy of the validation set. If the
validation set is not accurately classified by TO then, it may con-
tains less information and all the samples in the validation set may
belong to a few classes only. To avoid this, the validation set may
be assigned an information content score as follows:
Score(S) = IGtree(Tr,DecisionTree(S))/Entropy(Tr)
(6)
where Tr is the training set confidential to the model owner. The
model owner scores the validation set using the above rule before
Algorithm 2 greedyUserSelection
Input: validation set S, query history Q, parameter k
Output: set of k users, their extraction status
source_gain = IGtree(S, TO)
pool = [1, · · · , n], U = {}
for i = 1tok do
x = −1,max_gain = 0
for j ∈ pool do
gain = IGtree(S,DecisionTree(Q[{U ∪ j}]))
if gain > max_gain then
x = j,max_gain = gain
end if
end for
if x! = −1 then
U = {U ∪ x}, pool = {pool \ x}
end if
end for
return U, (max_gain/source_gain) ∗ 100
handing it to the monitor. The score can thus be used to assign a
confidence value to the model extraction status estimates.
Algorithm 3 updateModelSummaries
Input: UserID, Query q
Output: create/update user summary
S = getExistingUserSummary(UserID)
classID, leafID ← TS .predict(q)
if S ! = Null then
leaf_info← S[leafID]
for feature ∈ leaf_info do
feature[0] = min(q[feature], feature.min)
feature[1] = max(q[feature], feature.max)
end for
else
leaf_info[ft][2]← newArray()
for feature ∈ leaf_info do
feature[0] = q[feature]
feature[1] = q[feature]
end for
end if
S[leafID]← leaf_info
Strategy 2: Model Extraction Warning using
Compact User Summaries
Initialization
In the previous strategy, the monitor stores historical queries of
all users accessing a model and maintains running decision trees on
a combination of these queries. This can be computationally expen-
sive if the number of users and queries are large. We now propose a
novel approach wherein the monitor maintains and updates a com-
pact model summary corresponding to each user with increasing
number of queries. Each user’s model summary effectively encom-
passes boundaries of regions within the feature space that the user
may have learnt for each class. The monitor assess the coverage
of summaries within their respective classes to compute the overall
learning rate of a user. To assess the coverage accurately, the mon-
itor uses the leaf id to which a query maps in the source decision
tree in addition to the class label, which most decision tree APIs in-
clude in their response 1 (e.g. BigML). Additionally, if there are C
classes, the monitor obtains the class probabilities from the model
owner i.e. probability pi that an element from the training data be-
longs to class Ci and the hyper volume of each class (Class_V oli)
(explained in the next subsections).
Model Summary for each user.
For each user, the monitor observes all queries and their re-
sponses made to the deployed model TO . The query response in-
cludes the class label and the leaf id to which a query maps in TO .
For a deployed decision tree model TO with lt leaf nodes and ft
continuous input features2, each user’s model summary is main-
tained as a matrix M of size lt×ft. The entry M(i, j) corresponds
to a linear constraint ([min,max]) on the feature j that the user has
learned for leaf node i. When a user issues a new query to TO , its
summary is updated using Algorithm 3.
For ease of exposition, we present a simple example. Consider a
deployed decision tree model with ft = 2 training features, t = 7
leaf nodes, and 5 classes. Let the class labels and decision bound-
aries created by the leaf nodes be as shown in Figure 4(a). Let two
users A and B query this deployed model. Then, Figure 4(b) and
4(c) show the user queries as points in the feature space along with
the rectangular summaries stored by the monitor for each leaf node.
Model Extraction Status Per User.
To compute model extraction status for a user, the monitor com-
putes the area (equivalently hypervolume when ft >= 3) corre-
sponding to each leaf i using entries M(i, j) ∀j in the model sum-
mary matrix as follows,
Leaf_V oli =
∏
j∈ft
abs(M(i, j).max−M(i, j).min) ∀i ∈ lt
(7)
Then the area of each class is computed by aggregating leaves
of the same class and the extraction percentage per class is com-
puted using the ratio of the area in the model summary to the area
per class of the source model (Note that the monitor has access to
the hypervolume of each class in the source model) as shown in
Equation 8.
Ext_Per_Classi =
∑
l∈Ci(Leaf_V oli)
Class_V oli
∀i ∈ C (8)
Finally, the extraction status of a user is computed as a weighted
sum of per-class extraction percentages by weighing each term with
the class probability pi.
Extraction_Status =
∑
i∈C
(pi ∗ Ext_Per_Classi) (9)
For all the users whose extraction status is above the threshold
t, a model extraction warning is generated and sent to the relevant
model owners.
Model Extraction Status with Collusion.
As discussed for Strategy 1 in Section 3, a model owner may
be interested to know the joint extraction of a set of k users who
may be colluding. Here again we use a greedy approach to com-
pute the set of k users with maximum knowledge of the model in
1This assumption is not new as authors in [6] leverage it to mount
model extraction attacks against decision trees.
2This strategy does not consider categorical features, since the no-
tion of area or hyper-volume does not hold for such features
(a): Class Boundaries of Source
Model
(b): Summary of User A (c): Summary of User B (d): Combined Summary of User A
and B
Figure 3: Model Summary Example
polynomial time. The only difference in the algorithm is that dur-
ing the the user selection step, the monitor chooses a user such
that the combined model summary has the maximum hypervolume
instead of maximum Information Gain. Fig. 4(d) illustrates an ex-
ample of combining the model summaries of two users. The next
section presents experimental results of extraction status for both
single and collusion of adversarial users.
4. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we present experimental results to evaluate the
performance of the two model extraction warning strategies out-
lined in section 3. The results are presented for both individual as
well as colluding adversaries. We simulate two attack strategies that
are employed by adversaries: (i) Random query attack: This is a
naive strategy wherein adversaries generate random queries span-
ning the input space and get their prediction from the deployed
model. Further these adversaries use this query-response pair to
train a decision tree in order to steal the deployed model. (ii) De-
cision tree path-finding algorithm (Tramer attack): This is a more
sophisticated attack approach proposed by [6] to specifically steal
decision tree models. Here an adversary generates input samples to
recursively search for the rule sets corresponding to each leaf node
of the deployed tree. It leverages the leaf ids which are returned by
the query response in addition to the class label. To remain consis-
tent with prior work and present extraction status results for ML
models deployed as MLaaS, we use BigML’s decision tree APIs.
The model owner uses these API to train and deploy a decision
tree. The adversaries abuses this API to launch extraction attacks.
We assume that adversaries are aware of the feature space in order
to generate intelligent queries. However, the monitor is agnostic to
any attack strategies employed by the adversaries.
We use the BigML datasets listed in table 1 for experimentation
as used in prior work. The IRS model predicts a US state, based
on administrative tax records. The Steak and GSS models respec-
tively predict a person’s preferred steak preparation and happiness
level, from survey and demographic data. The Email Importance
model predicts whether Gmail classifies an email as ’important’ or
not, given message metadata [6]. The original decision tree models
have been trained and deployed on BigML by authors of [6]. The
validation set for strategy 1 is chosen randomly from training data
and varies between 5-10% of the dataset size.
Model extraction status for individual adversaries.
Figure 4 plots the extraction status output by the monitor us-
ing the two proposed strategies and compares these with the per-
formance of the model learnt by the adversary using 1 − Rtest
with increasing number of queries. In each case, we observe that
the 1 − Rtest steadily increases when the adversary launches the
Dataset Records Features Classes
IRS Tax Pattern 191283 37 51
GSS Survey 51020 7 3
Email Importance 4709 14 2
Steak Survey 412 12 5
Table 1: BigML Datasets used for experimentation
Tramer attack to recover the rule sets of all leaf nodes (i.e. “User
RS(Tramer)"). However the performance of an adversary’s decision
tree learnt from random queries varies across datasets as the distri-
bution of random queries and training data may vary (i.e. “Mon-
itor/User DT(Rand)"). In strategy 1, the monitor maintains a run-
ning decision tree to compute the information gain with respect
to the validation set. When strategy 1 is used to estimate learn-
ing rate of the user model based on Tramer attack, we observe
that the initial extraction status is high (“Strategy 1(Tramer)") as
the Tramer attack only recovers the rule sets of leaves sequentially
without attempting to utilize any other benefit from the generated
queries. In contrast, the monitor attempts to quantify the knowledge
gained from the generated queries using a decision tree and there-
fore estimates a higher extraction status. The 1−Rtest performance
of monitor’s decision tree is shown under “Monitor DT(Tramer)",
while the corresponding extraction status is shown under “Strat-
egy1(Tramer)".
For higher number of queries, monitor’s extraction status based
on strategy 1 better matches the 1−Rtest of the adversary’s model
based on Tramer attack (i.e. “User RS(Tramer)"). We also observe
that the 1−Rtest of the decision tree constructed by the monitor can
sometimes yield a lower value due to the difference in distribution
of training set and the queries generated by Tramer attack.
In case of strategy 2, we observe that the extraction status more
closely matches the 1 − Rtest for models learnt by the adversary
using random queries (“Strategy 2 (Tramer)") as well as Tramer
attack queries (“Strategy 2 (Tramer)" ). In this case, the monitor
maintains compact model summaries based on the span of the input
space and therefore is less impacted by the distribution of queries
generated by either Tramer attack or Random queries. Figure 4(d)
plots results only for strategy 1 as the dataset includes several cate-
gorical features while strategy 2 is more suited for continuous fea-
tures.
Model extraction status for colluding adversaries.
Figure 5 plots the extraction status output by the monitor for the
case of colluding adversarial users. The top subplots present results
for the setting where n = 10 users launch simultaneous Tramer
attacks. The model extraction status is generated using strategy 2
(a): IRS Tax (b): GSS Survey (c): Email Importance (d): Steak Survey
Figure 4: Results of model extraction status for individual adversaries based on BigML datasets.
(a): GSS Survey (b): Email Importance
Figure 5: Results of model extraction status for colluding adversaries based on BigML datasets.
when any k ∈ {1, 3, 5} users are colluding (k = 1 implies sin-
gle adversarial user). As expected, when the number of colluding
users increase, the extraction status increases consistently during
all times of the attack. For example, Figure 5(a) shows that when
1000 queries are processed from each user, the extraction status for
single adversarial user (k = 1) is 28%, for k = 3 users is 51%,
and for k = 5 users is 69%.
Similarly the bottom plots consider the setting of n = 10 users
launching simultaneous Random attacks. The model extraction sta-
tus is generated using strategy 1 when any k ∈ {1, 3, 5} users are
colluding. As discussed above, a similar increase in the extraction
status occurs as the number of colluding users increases.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
More and more cloud vendors such as Amazon, Google, and
IBM are offering next generation services based on machine learn-
ing. While these services are gaining popularity among application
developers, they are susceptible to attacks from adversaries who
may steal the deployed models and compromise future payments
or privacy of the training data.
In this work, we presented the design of a cloud-based extrac-
tion monitor that can inform model owners about the status of
model extraction by both individual and colluding adversaries in
the context of decision trees. We proposed two novel metrics to
infer the model learning rate of adversarial users. The first metric
is based on entropy and measures the information gain of a de-
cision tree with respect to a validation set provided by the model
owner. The second metric is based on maintaining compact model
summaries and computing the coverage of the input space relative
to the partitions induced by the source model. Both these metrics
may also be used within a greedy algorithm to determine the set
k users who have maximum knowledge of the model in the pres-
ence of collusion. We evaluated these metrics using two known at-
tack techniques on BigML datasets. Our experimental results show
that these metrics can provide approximate information about the
knowledge extracted by adversarial users in the context of decision
tree models.
In future work, we plan to extend our work to more datasets
and other non-interpretable ML models such as neural networks.
In particular, we plan to explore the use of proxy ML models at the
monitor that can provide extraction status of original source mod-
els irrespective of their type. We also plan to explore information
theoretic metrics to quantify the loss of privacy of training data in
model extraction attacks.
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